Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 1

Article 15

1965

Fuller, The Morality of Law
Ovid C. Lewis

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ovid C. Lewis, Fuller, The Morality of Law, 17 W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 349 (1965)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol17/iss1/15

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Fuller, The Morality of Law
Erratum
PAGE 351, LINE 7: change "proferred" to "profered."

This book review is available in Case Western Reserve Law Review: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/
caselrev/vol17/iss1/15

1965]

BOOK REVIEWS
THE MORALITY OF THE LAW. By Lon L. Fuller. New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1964. Pp. vii, 202. $5.00.
The heuristic value of a theory is reflected by its capacity to pro-

voke curiosity, stimulate further research and writing, stir up doubt,
and even arouse disbelief and resistance to its acceptance. If the
heuristic influence of a theory of law is the crucial test for its significance, then that presented in The Morality of Law passes with ease.
Since publication last year, the interest, and sometimes disbelief,
generated by this little book has produced fourteen book reviews1
and a comprehensive critique.'
Unfortunately the direct utility of Fuller's theory of law for a
fuller understanding of law and legal institutions is not as readily
discernible as is its heuristic impact. In fact, the noted proliferation of commentaries concerning his text constitutes in part, a protest to a theory of law that portends obfuscation rather than elucidation. Such a protest is scarcely startling since Professor Fuller
apparently is involved in a one-man recrudescence of natural law
theory which "is the view .which denies the possibility of a rigid
separation of the is and the ought, and which tolerates a confusion
of them in legal discussion."' Although the resulting failure to
distinguish facts from values and morality from law, will "inevitably
tend to obscure the. boundary. between law and morality and to im* IBrady,.Book Review, 43 TEXAs L. REV. 258 (1964); Campbell, Book Review, 28
MODERN L. REV. 370 (1965); Dias, Book Review, 1965 CAME. L.J. 157 (1965);
Hanft, Book Review, 43 N.C.L. RE . 238 (1964); Hart, Book Review, 78 HARv. L
RIV. 1281 (1965); Hosking, Book Review, 40 CALIF. S.B.J.' 90 (1965); Hughes, Book
Review, 17 STAN. L.'REV.547 -<1965); Mandelbaum; Book Review, 10 N.Y.L.F. 648
(1964); McDowell, B6ok Review, 44 B.U.L REv. 587 -(1964); Meyer, Book Review,
10 MCGILt ..
J . 380 (1964-); Rose, Book Review, 39 TUL. L REv. 387 (1965); Savarese, Book Review, 53 GE6 L.J. 250 (1964);- Tucker, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J.
270 (1965); Wasserstrom, Book Review, 19 RuTGERs L. REV. 581 (1965).
2
Summers, ProfessorFuller on Morality and Law, 18 J.LEGAL ED. 1 (1965).
,tiULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF 5 (1940). For a critical xeview see
Cohen, Should Legal Thought Atandon ClearDhtinctions?, 36 ILL. L. REV. 239 (1941).
In commenting on The Law in Quest of Itself, Professor Cowan observes: "Fuller
shows in this book quite dearly the links of modern legal realism with natural law. In
fact, he just barely misses calling for a revival of natural law." Cowan, A Report on
the Status of Philosophy of Law in the United Stales, 50 CoiJrM. L. REV. 1086, 1096
(1950).' The thesis advanced here is that in The Morality of Law Fuller does not
miss. On-the confusion and difficulties inhereht in the natural law approach see Kelsen,
Plato and the Doctrine of Natural Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 23 (1960); Nielsen, An
Examination of the Thomistic Theory of -Natural Moral Law, 4 NATuRAL LF. 44
(1959).
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port into the law the looser and freer ways characteristic of ethical
thinking,"4 Professor Fuller continues to deny that the is and ought
can be distinguished, at least where purposive behavior is involved.5
Ironically, one of the explicit aims of The Morality of Law is "to
clarify the meaning of morality" (p. 3). Success in this respect
would of course enhance our ability to separate, at least for purposes
of analysis, law and morals as well as the is and the ought, thereby
enabling us ultimately to make more responsible evaluations.6 But,
as one might anticipate, confronted with Fuller's passion for fusing
is and ought, the meaning of morality is something less than darfied by this book which apprises the reader that morality has an
"inner morality,"7 (p. 130) and that morality is "concerned with
controlling human conduct by rules" (p. 130). Since law is defined
as the "enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance
of rules" (pp. 91, 96, 106, 122 124, 130) the boundary between
law and morality is indeed obscured.
Professor Fuller's contribution to clarity is the distinction between a morality of duty and a morality of aspiration.' The morality of duty consists of "the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain goals must fail of its mark" (pp. 5-6). As one moves
away from "the conditions obviously essential to social life" (p. 27)
a point is reached "where the pressure of duty leaves off and the
challenge of excellence begins" (p. 10). It is precisely at this point
that one reaches the level of a morality of aspiration, "the morality
of the Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest realization of human
powers" (p. 5). It is crucial, according to Fuller, that this point be
4 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 130.
5 Professor Fuller's insistence on a fusion of the is and the ought is the central issue

in the Hart-Fuller and Fuller-Nagel debates. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L Rnv. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law
A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L REV. 630 (1958); Fuller, Human Purpose
and NaturalLaw, 3 NATURAL LF. 68 (1958); Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and Value:
A Reply to Professor Fuller, 3 NATURAL LF. 77 (1958); Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NATURAL LF. 83 (1958); Nagel, Fact, Value, and Human Purpose,
4 NATURAL L.F. 26 (1959). Professor Hart develops his position with great clarity
and force in THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961), criticized by Fuller in a chapter entitled
"The Concept of Law," in TnE MORALITY oF LAw 95 (1964). Professor Hart as of
this date has had the last published word. See Hart, supra note 1.
6
See Nagel, Fact, Value, and Human Purpose, 4 NATURAL LF. 26, 36-37 (1959).
7 The implication of this view within the context of Fuller's complete theory is that
morality may be immoral. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to
ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 638 (1958).
8 A distinction which he admits is "by no means new" and which was discussed by
Professor Hart in TEM CONCEPT OF LAw 176-80 (1961).
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determined accurately, since the law can in most cases effectively
enforce only the morality of duty:
[T]here is no way open to us by which we can compel a man to live
the life of reason. We can only seek to exclude from his life the
grosser and more obvious manifestations of chance and irrationality
(p. 9). 9
It seems dear that not only is the proferred distinction a difficult one to make (at least as difficult as that between the is and the
ought) but it also lacks sufficient preciseness of definition. Morality is a term that may refer to that which is desired or that which
is desirable, to a "practical socio-cultural fact in respect to matters
of right and wrong, good and evil, and [tol ... theories about the
ends, standards, principles according to which the actual state of affairs is to be surveyed and judged."'" Professor Hart proposes that
we call the existing mores of any given social group "positive morality," and those general moral principles or ideals used as criterion
for evaluation of positive morality and other social institutions
"critical morality."" Morality necessarily refers to a man's values,
his preferences and avoidances, his desire-objects and aversion-objects, his pleasure and pain tendendes, his goals, ideals, interests
and disinterests, what he takes to be right and wrong, good and
evil, beautiful and ugly, useful and useless, his approvals and disapprovals,
his criteria of taste and standards of judgment, and so
12
forth.
In a recent extensive commentary Professor Summers develops
and documents at such length Fullers failure to define and clarify
9 A point made by St. Thomas Aquinas who noted that "human laws do not forbid
all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which
it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others,
without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained." AQUINAS,
Suamma Theologica, in THE GRnAT IEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 56, 74 (Morris ed 1959).
1ODrwY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOsOPHY 19-20 (Mentor ed. 1950).
11 HART, LAW, IIBERTY AND MORALnY 20 (1963). After an extensive study,
employing a similar dichotomy, several cultural anthropologists concluded that
the general lesson of our inquiry would seem to be that ethical concepts, no
matter how detached they are felt to be in consciousness, have cultural roots
and cultural functions, and their meaning is to be found in the offices they
perform. And criteria would seem to have a similar character. The criteria
in any evaluation of virtues, goals, ideals, needs, and so on, are other virtues,
goals, ideals, needs, more abstract or more concrete, which have become enlisted on behalf of the ethical concepts to carry out their office in the given
context
EDEL & EDEL, ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS 226 (1959).
12
Edel, Concept of Values in ContemporaryPhilosophicalValue Theory, 20 PHILoSOPHY Or SCIENCE 198 (1953). For an excellent survey of the problems of terminology in moral and ethical inquiry see Handy & Kurtz, A Current Appraisalof Behavioral
Sdences, 7 THE AM. BEHAvIORAL ScIENTIST 131-35 (Supp. No. 7,, 1964).
,
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adequately the concept of morality, that little more need be said on
that subject,'" except to note that it is not clear what is gained by
calling the minimal standards that must be met for the survival
and maintenance of a going society a "morality of duty" rather than
functional imperatives, 4 functional prerequisites, 5 or even eunomics. 6 There are enough difficulties inherent in a structuralfunctional analysis of society, or its subsystems, without intentionally
adding the confusion of fusion of fact and value to the inquiry.' 7
Analytically, once the ends or needs of a society are determined,
determination of the means that will achieve these ends is strictly
factual, although rejection or selection among alternative means involves a moral inquiry.' 8
If the functional prerequisites for the maintenance and survival
of a society constitute a morality of duty, then minimal requirements
for the effective maintenance of a legal system also are properly
categorized in Fuller's terms as a morality of duty. Instead Fuller
describes these requirements as law's inner morality" or the internal
morality of law.2" Th- internal morality of law is concerned with
the "ways in which [a legal system] . . . must be constructed and
13

Summers arrives at the following conclusion: 'Thus, in sum, the author's approach to the clarification of morality cannot be adequate to the task. He does not
tell us whether he is clarifying morality as it is or as it ought to be. The distiictions
he undertakes to draw are sufficient only to provide the crudest account of the internal
complexities of morality." Summers, supra note 2, at 5.
14

See

PARSONS, AN OUTLINE OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEM, IN THEORIES OF SOCIETY

30, 38 (Parsons, Shis, Naegele & Pitts eds.'1961). For 'a functional analysis of law
employing Parsons approach see BREDEMEMR, Law as an Integrative Mechanism, in
LAW AND SOCIOLOGY

73 (Evan ed. 1962).

15 See Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy & Sutton, The FunctionalPrerequisitesof a Society, 60 ETHIcs 100 (1950).
16 "[Eunomics] . . . may be defined as the science, theory, or study of good order
and workable arrangements. Eunomics involves" no commitment to 'ultimate ends.'"
Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457, 477 (1954).
17 Professor Fuller observed not too long ago that it is virtually impossible to draw
clear-cut distinctions between ends and instrumental means for achieving those ends.
See STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 103 (1959). In addition
it is extremely difficult to demonstrate exactly Fhat are the functional imperatives for a
society. The principal objections to the functional approach are set forth in the recent

monograph

FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE STRENGTH AND LIMITS
OF FUNCTIONALISM IN ANTHROPOLOGY, ECONOMICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND SOCI-

(Martindale ed. 1965). See especially the following pages of the monograph:
7, 9, 14, 22-25, 30, 33, 78, 87, 121-24, 140, 142-43, 157-59..
18 This is not to suggest that the selection of an appropriate means of achieving a
desired end is an easy task. As Austin noted: "[Ilt is far easier to conceive justly what
would be useful law,. than so construct that same law that it may accomplish the design
of the lawgiver." 2 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 1136 (4th ed. 1873).
* .19 See, e.g., FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 42-43 (1964).
20
See, e.g., id. at 44, 47.
OLOGY
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administered if it is to be efficacious and at the same time remain
what it purports to be" (p. 97). Since these functional imperatives
of a social subsystem, according to Fuller, constitute a morality, he
is constrained to categorize them as either a morality of duty or one
of aspiration. He concludes that although law's inner morality embraces both a morality of duty and of aspiration, the demand for creativity and excellence of the inner morality condemns it "to remain
largely a morality of aspiration and not of duty" (p. 43) .1
Recognizing the not inconsiderable differences between St.
Thomas Aquinas and Ion Fuller, it is nonetheless possible to find
some significant congruencies between the Thomistic view of law
and that presented in The Morality of Law, especially in the manner in which one ascertains the content of the moralities of duty and
aspirationtm
Like Aquinas and Aristotle, Fuller stresses the role of reason in
moral inquiry. The morality of duty deals with the "more obvious
manifestations of chance and irrationality" (p. 9). Since it operates
"at the lower levels of human achievement" a "defective performance can be recognized, if care is taken, with comparative certainty"
(p. 31). "We can... know what is plainly unjust [the concern of
a morality of duty] without committing ourselves to declare with
finality what lperfect justice [the concern of a morality of aspiration] would be like" (p. 12).23 This emphasis on reason in ascertaining the morality of duty and the internal morality of law,
coupled with Fuller's insistence that law be viewed teleologically,
i.e., as a purposeful enterprise aiming at "subjecting human conduct
to the guidance and control of general rules" (p. 146), is reminiscent of the Thomistic notion of the practical reason which directs
one properly toward achieving a particular goal.24 For Aquinas
"the la9t end of human life is bliss or happineis."25 Although Professor Fuller characterizes his own approach as a "modest" teleology
(p. 147), he is not one who engages in*"unconscious metaphysics"2
and thus we can assume that he intends to adopt the view that law
is directed toward an end and shaped by a purpose. Teleological
PI
22 See also id. at 104.
See note 9 supra. For a good summary of Aquinas' functionalism, see Davitt, Law
as Means to End- Thomas Aquinas, 14 VAm. L. REv. 65 (1960).
23 On the notion that certain basic ethical truths are self-evident'see AQUINAS, op.
cit. supra note 9, at 67.
24 Id. at 57, 67.
25 1d. at 58.
-26 See Fuller, The Place and Uses of Jurisprudencein the Law School Curriculum,
1 J. LEGALIED. 495, 505 (1949).
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explanations need not necessarily espouse the idea that an ultimate
end-out-of-view directs change, but generally they are associated
with the doctrine that "goals or ends of activity are dynamic agents
in their own realizations." 7 Fuller, like Aquinas, apparently adheres to the latter view, for how else could he write the following:
It is, then, precisely because law is a purposeful enterprise that
it displays structural constancies which the legal theorist can discover and treat as uniformities in the factually given. If he realized on what he built his theory, he might be less inclined to conceive of himself as being like the scientist who discovers a uniformity of inanimate nature. But perhaps in the course of rethinking his subject he might gain a new respect for his own species
and come to see that it, too, and not merely the electron, can leave
behind a discernible pattern (p. 151).
Coherence and goodness have more affinity than coherence and
evil. Accepting this belief, I also believe that when men are compelled to explain and justify their decisions, the effect will general-

ly be to pull those decisions toward goodness, by whatever standards of ultimate goodness there are.28
[A] judge faced with two equally plausible interpretations of a

statute might properly prefer that which would bring its terms into

harmony with generally accepted principles of right and wrong
(p. 132)
and thus

[the judge] ... is playing his part in the eternal process by which
the common law works itself pure and adapts itself to the needs of

a new day. 9
Thus, Fuller's penchant for perceiving phenomena as purposeful with fact and value fused illustrates the merit of the objections
to a functional approach of many who anticipate therein the teleological implication of a metaphysical ordering"0 and that the pulling force of the system is easily exaggerated."'
27 See NAGEI, THE STRucTURE oF ScIENcE 402 (1961).
"The teleological viewpoint explains the present in terms of the future. According to this viewpoint, man's
personality is comprehended in terms of where it is going, not where it has been." HALL
& LINDZEY, THEORIEs OF PERsoNALrrY 96 (1957).
28

Fuller, supra note 7, at 636. This of course raises the same issues and perplexities

as the Thomistic "inclination to the good." "Since, however, good has the nature of an
end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has
a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance."
AQUINAS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 66. On the problems attendant on acceptance of this
view see Nielsen, supra note 3. On coherence theories see HALL, OUR KNOWLEDGE OF
FACT AND VALUE 78-80 (1961).
29 FULLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 140.
30 SeeSPENCER, The Natureand Value of Functionalism in Anthropology, in FUNcTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENcEs 1, 14 (1965).
31
See KRUPP, Equilibrium Theory in Economics and in Functional Analysis as
Types of Explanation, in FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SoCIAL SCIENcEs 65, 78 (1965).
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Aquinas' theory of resistance postulated that where the law is
contrary to the common good, it is not to be obeyed, unless the disorder created by disobedience is more onerous than the evil occasioned by obedience to an unjust law. 2 A law is contrary to the
common good not only for pursuing evil ends, but for being improper in form. The requirements that law must meet to be binding in conscience are included in Aquinas' definition of law as "an
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has
care of the community, and promulgated."33 Fuller's theory of
resistance is based in large part on the requirement of promulgation
without which, law, the purposive enterprise of subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules, could not succeed. If the internal morality of law is not satisfied, then "there is no moral obligation to obey the law" (p. 39)." Fuller lists eight ways in which
the internal morality of law may fail: (1) absence of rules; (2)
lack of promulgation; (3) an excess of retroactive legislation; (4)
incomprehensible rules; (5) contradictory rules; (6) rules impossible to perform; (7) too frequent alteration of the rules; and (8)
lack of congruence between the law-in-books and the law-in-action. 5
Aquinas stressed the rule element in law ("law is a rule and
measure of acts..., a rule of reason") ," the requirement of promulgation,"7 and by implication, the need for understandable and consistent rules.38 Aquinas' commentary on the problem of too frequent
changes in the law is especially pertinent:
[H]uman law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weaL But, to a certain extent, the mere
change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that
what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is
32

When the positive law is contrary to divine law then, regardless of the resulting
disorder, one must resist the unjust law. See, AQUINAS, op. cit supra note 9, at 74.
33 Id. at 60.
34 "A total failure in [the inner morality of law] ... does not simply result in a
bad system of law;, it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at
all .. ."(p. 39).
3
5Id. at 39.
36 AQuwAs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 57.
3
7"A law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure
is implied by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore,
in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be
applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being
notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law
to obtain its force." Id. at 60.
38 Ibid.
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looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, the
binding power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is
abolished. Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from some very great and very evident
benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the extreme
urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the existing law is
dearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore the
jurist says that in establishing new laws, there should be evidence
of the benefit to be derived before departingfrom a law which has
long been considered just.P

On the possibility of performance of the law Aquinas states:
"Wherefore laws imposed on men should also be in keeping with
their condition, for ... law should be possible both according to
nature, and according to the customs of the country."4
Finally, Aquinas would certainly have desired that the law-inaction comport with the law-in-books. Why else would he have
stressed that "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than

left to be decided by judges."'
It is thus possible, even in such a brief overview, to see that
Aquinas' analysis adumbrated much that Fuller has to say concerning both morality and the requisites for an effective legal system.
An examination of these requirements is useful, and Fuller does an
excellent job in his discussion of his "inner morality of the law"
(p. 97), which he also calls procedural natural law. However, in
view of his merger of value and fact and "modest" teleological (p.
147) tendencies, it appears that Fuller is mote natural lawyer than
his disclaimers would indicate.' For this reason many of the same
strictures that apply to Thomistic doctrines are relevant to The Morality of Law:
[T]he whole theory [Thomistic teleology] rests on the confu-

sion between what ought to be and what is ...values and facts
are distinct, and Aquinas and his followers are not dear about this

distinction, precisely because they looked upon nature as purposive,
as having some kind of moral end in itself. This conception of a
purposive nature is'not only false but it also serves to obfuscate
the basic distinction between facts and values that is so essential

if we 48are to understand the nature of moral argument and decision.
a9 Id.at 77.
4
0 Id. at 73.
41.Id. at 70..
42 See FULLER, op. Cit. supra note 19, at 96.
43 Nielsen, supra note 3, at 59.
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Today, more than ever, a reasoned analysis of law and legal institutions is desirable. Confusion of fact and value, morality and
instrumental concepts, and regression to a teleological orientation is
not the road to a better understanding of the law and its impact on
society. Burdened with these defects, the heuristic influence of The
Morality of Law can only be on a short term basis.
OvID C. LEWIS*

ENGLISH JUSTICE BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE

GREAT CHARTER 1066-1215.

By Doris M. Stenton. Philadelphia:
The American Philosophical Society. 1964. Pp. ix, 238. $2.50.
The general history of English justice between 1066 and 1215
is well-known to anyone who has had occasion to study the great
works of Maitland' or Bigelow.2 There is, however, a great corpus
of knowledge concerning the centuries immediately before and after
1066 that even the omnivorous energies of these great scholars could
not reach. Finally uncovered by a lifetime of research, Lady Stenton,
former General Editor of the Pipe Roll Society, presents in this
book8 for the first time her findings and conclusions on an unfamiliar but important subject in the development of English legal institutions.
Concentrating on procedure in civil pleas and the gradual creation of a bench of judges and a legal profession, Lady Stenton begins with an analysis of procedural developments in the early twelfth
century and the dependence of these developments on the AngloSaxon past. In this respect, she maintains, contrary to popular belief, that the conquest of William I introduced little new law into
the English kingdom. "William I was not a voluminous legislator.
He willed that all should have 'the law of King Edward in lands
and in all things, having added thereto the things which I have appointed for the welfare of the people of the English"' (p. 6). With
the exception of a few minor refinements in the penal laws and the
separation of lay and ecclesiastical justice, "he added little to the
procedure of the courts" (p. 6). In the same vein, Lady Stenton
rejects previous notions that the Frankish inquest was the source
*Associate Professor of Law, Western Reserve University School of Law.
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of the English jury, finding instead, that it appeared in certain practices of the Anglo-Saxons and Danes in the generations before
1066. "There is no longer any inherent improbability in the suggestion that the jury, common to the Scandinavian peoples on either
side of the North Sea, rising to the surface for a moment under
Aethelred II, may have persisted in England to become incorporated
into the fabric of the Anglo-Norman state" (p. 16).
Perhaps one of the most productive periods of original legal reform between 1066 and 1215 was the reign of Henry II. Lady
Stenton characterizes this period in the second chapter of the book
as part of "the Angevin leap forward" (pp. 22-53). "Supported by
as able a group of ministers as ever served an English king," Henry
II produced a new and highly individualistic legal system (p. 26).
Notable among the accomplishments of this period was the use and
development of the returnable writ.' Although the vast mass of
1

MAITLAND & POLLOCK, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898).

2 BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND (1880); BIGELOW, PLACITA
ANGLO-NoRMANNICA (1879).
s The book includes major portions of the Jayne Lecture for 1963, comprising the
first three chapters, the Raleigh Lectures of the British Academy for 1958, comprising
the fourth chapter, and six appendices that include documents significant to the development of the ideas set forth.
4Maitland reached the conclusion that the English jury system had its origin in the
Frankish inquests, but only after raising some doubt. Consider the following commentary: "No doubt there is here a field for research, but it seems unlikely that any new
discovery will disturb the derivation of our English from the Frankish inquests. We
cannot say a priori that there is only one possible origin for the jury. We cannot even
say that England was unprepared for the introduction of this institution; but that the
Norman duke brought it with him as one of his prerogatives can hardly be disputed."
MAITLAND & POLLOCK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 143.
rVinogradoff was also skeptical of the notion that the Normans brought the jury
system to England. Writing in 1908, he stated: 'he continuity of the Frankish and
Norman inquest procedure ... does not preclude that in preconquestual England itself
there had existed legal customs which prepared the way for the indictment jury of the
twelfth century."

VINOGRADOFF, ENGLISH SOCIETY IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY

7 (1908).
Commenting on this observation, Lady Stenton states that "Vinogradoff
knew more than Maitland of the Scandinavian element in English law and was less ready
than most of his contemporaries to write it off because there was little evidence about
it coming from an early date" (p. 17).
6
Itis generally understood that none of the old executive or justicies writs predating
the reign of Henry II were returnable. Professor van Caenegem has recently argued,
however, that a system of returnable writs was in existence long before the reign of
Henry II. He suggests that there is evidence that the returnable writ system began with
William I and William I. VAN CAENEGEM ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE
CONQUEST TO GLANVILL 77 (1959).
But Lady Stenton points out that although writs
utilized during those periods had certain attributes of a returnable writ, most lacked the
essential elements of a true returnable writ. She notes that not one (1) appointed a
day for the hearing of the action, (2) indicated the way it should be dealt with, or
(3) instructed the recipient of the writ to send men to view the land at issue and appear
when the case was heard with the summoners and the writ (pp. 33-34).
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eyre rolls made up in the last years of Henry II have been destroyed,
sufficient evidence has been found to lead Lady Stenton to conclude
"that it was Henry 11 with his returnable writs and his carefully
built up bench of judges, through his own versatility and that of his
great Justiciar, Rannuf de Glanville, who had started the wheel in
perpetual motion which generated the English common law" (p.53).
Turning her attention in the third chapter from the development
of procedure to the establishment of the courts of justice and the beginning of the legal profession, Lady Stenton again points to preconquestual Anglo-Saxon institutions as providing the foundations for
these Anglo-Norman developments. Although no central court
system existed in the old English state, the judicial needs of the
people and the administrative needs of the crown were adequately
satisfied by such local courts as the shire and hundred. Moreover,
even after the feudal courts had been established, these local courts
continued to play an important role in English justice; indeed even
William I ordered all men to seek "the hundred and shire courts as
our ancestors commanded. . . ." Thus, no regular supervision of
the local courts was carried out in the early post-conquest days. But
as commerce increased, so too did the need for a central court system.
It is in the discussion of this subject that Lady Stenton reveals for
the first time new evidence of the importance of the royal ministers
and their influence on English common law.
In the last chapter of the textual portion of the book, Lady
Stenton re-evaluates the work of King John and the development of
the courts of justice during his reign. Although generally characterized as an illiterate intrigant in popular fables, King John appears
in this book as a hard-working, intelligent monarch; as one genuinely interested in the development of English justice. "In the
long view it may well appear that in the matter of judicial administration King John deserves credit rather than blame. He should
be credited with readiness to allow litigants access to the benefits of
his courts and the wisdom of his judges even if their pleas did not
conform precisely with established rules. In this way the common
law grew in volume and strength" (pp. 113-14). King John is
also to be credited with lending vital support to the legal profession by encouraging the practice of leaving the conduct of cases in
his courts to an attorney.
7
IjEBmANN, DIE GES ETZB DER ANGELSACHSEN 448 (Halle ed. 1903). In
like manner, Henry I willed that all men should go to the shires and hundreds as they
had in the time of King Edward. STUBBS, SBLrECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 122 (9th ed. 1913).
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It is not difficult to conclude after reading this book that Lady
Stenton has accomplished a graceful and thorough piece of work in
English legal history. The fruits of a lifetime of careful research
and thought are tightly compacted within the most refined limits.
Moreover, the style in which this newly discovered evidence is presented is unique; for beyond Lady Stenton's precise evaluation of the
mass of documents studied is the pleasure one finds in the rich prose
that weaves together some of the most important developments in
the history of English common law.
GARY
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